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  “If the question of Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this 
hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealment which it has 
brought about must be dissolved.  We understand this task as one in which by 
taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy the traditional 
content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in 
which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being – the ways 
which have guided us ever since.” 
 
  […Diese Aufgabe verstehen wir als die am Leitfaden der Seinsfrage sich 
vollziehende Destruktion des überlieferten Bestandes der antiken Ontologie auf 
die ursprünglichen Erfahrungen…] 
 
Being and Time has it that the “hardened tradition” of the “history of ontology” is to be 
made subject to a “destruction” which would return us to the “original experiences” 
which at the outset allowed the nature of Being to come forth. 
 
In the context of an unprecedented appropriation of the word deconstruction – now set 
to work as unambiguous signifier in all fields of culture from architecture (= wacky) to 
politics (=new New Labour) – this paper will interrogate the extent to which 
deconstruction was never anything other than Heidegger’s Destruktion.  Does the 
deployment of Derrida’s word intend to return us to “those primordial experiences”?  
To what extent is the “de” of deconstruction a negative prefix?  Is deconstruction a 
radical questioning of Destruktion? 
 






To begin: is Derrida’s work of deconstruction anything other than Heidegger’s Destruktion of 
metaphysics?  In giving myself this simple question to address I had hoped – felt assured – that 
something other than a simple answer would be, if not necessary, then at least possible.  But 
my bias and prejudice was clear to me from the outset of this paper.  Heidegger’s Destruktion is 
introduced and delimited in section 6 of Being and Time, thus 
 
  If the question of Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this hardened 
tradition must be loosened up, and the concealment which it has brought about must be 
dissolved.  We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of Being as 
our clue, we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at 
those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the 
nature of Being – the ways which have guided us ever since (p44, H22) 
 
The MacQuarrie/Robinson translation leaves us with the word destroy; the original German 
reads, somewhat more strongly: 
 
  Diese Aufgabe verstehen wir als die an Leitfaden der Seinsfrage sich vollziehende 
Destruktion des ueberlieferten [not “Traditionel”] Bestandes den antiken Ontologie auf 
die urspruenglichen Erfahrungen 
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If, for Derrida, it has from the earliest investigations of the problem of genesis in Husserl’s 
phenomenology been a question of doubting any claim to something like “primordial 
experiences” (“urspruengliche Erfahrungen”), then surely – my prejudice goes – at the very first 
glance one would be suspicious of any attempt to say, in respect of this issue, “this is that”: 
deconstruction is Destruktion.  Put this way, the question seems all the more certain: both 
deconstruction and Destruktion have as their avowed aim the calling into question of the 
hardened-up tradition of metaphysics, and the predetermination of the nature of things as 
“present”, that is, a questioning of the privileging of the form of statement “this is that”.  But 
the same logic applies in reverse, and cats at least some doubt on the issue, since it would be 
equally problematic to state simply that deconstruction is not Destruktion.  Hence, despite my 
bias, and despite a fear that the question could be answered simply in the affirmative (thus 
terminating the discussion), it remains necessary to elaborate, to go further than the logic of 
“this is that” or “this is not that”. 
 
It is, of course, Derrida’s essay Ousia and Gramme – A Note on a Note of Being and Time 
which addresses perhaps most thoroughly this issue.  According to the essay, in questioning 
the meaning of Being, it is the vulgar concept of time which Sein und Zeit had to “shake” in 
order to effect the Destruktion of ontology.  The interpretation of Being dependent on ousia, 
presence, the present, is to be destroyed by Heidegger’s endeavours, this being necessary in 
order to free up the tradition of thought and return us to primary experiences where an 
authentic rethinking can occur.  This rethinking of presence is a rethinking or a disavowal of the 
“vulgar concept of time” as a series of instances of “now”, each present to themselves or 
interpreted as the simple non-present.  Derrida does not question the necessity of this 
questioning of time, but wishes to extend the discussion according to a second motif, which he 
introduces thus: 
 
  [We wish] To indicate, from afar and in a still quite undecided way, a direction not 
opened by Heidegger’s meditations [in the note to Being and Time being analysed, and 
in Being and Time as a whole]; the hidden passageway that makes the problem of 
presence communicate with the problem of the written trace. 
 
Heidegger’s analysis of the vulgar concept of time, recounted through those of Hegel and 
Aristotle, is replayed by Derrida.  Time, traditionally, is that within which events occur and 
within which beings “are produced”.  First time, the framework, the “container”; then events, 
beings etc, thought here on the basis of a (perhaps Platonic) productive logic.  The note to 
Being and Time which is the topic of Derrida’s paper, which he reproduces in full, emphasises 
that Hegel’s prioritising of the “now” leaves him in the thrall of the ordinary concept of time, 
and that this concept derives point-by-point from the “physics” of Aristotle. 
 
In calling this tradition into question, Derrida states that Heidegger is involved in “an enormous 
task”.  As he says, (p38 in English translation in Margins): 
 
  how can one think Being and Time otherwise than on the basis of the present, in the 
form of the present, to wit a certain now in general from which no experience, by 
definition, can ever depart? 
 
The word experience is given emphasis here by Derrida; if the Destruktion  of metaphysics is to 
return us to primordial experiences, then is this not simply to refold us into the now?  Is not the 
very concept of experience only capable of being thought from out of the vulgar concept of 
time? 
 
Except that Derrida’s analysis insists retaining or reading in Heidegger’s work at this point 
something more subtle: 
 
  For Heidegger, it is not a question of proposing that we think otherwise [than on the 
basis of the present] if this means to think some other thing.  Rather, it is thinking that 
which could not have been, nor thought, otherwise.  [The impossibility of thinking 
otherwise…..] 
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It is this strange, at once formal and perhaps experiential structure, which interests Derrida 
here.  [For does he not speak elsewhere and quite often of the experience of the impossible?]  
This structure is perhaps the “hidden passageway” which he has already referred to in respect 
of Heidegger’s text. 
 
The argument runs: 
 
•  metaphysics thinks Being on the basis of presence, that is, on the basis of the 
vulgar concept of time 
•  in order to free up this tradition, it would be necessary to think otherwise than on 
the basis of presence 
•  it is necessary, says Heidegger, to return to our primordial experiences in doing this 
•  the very experience of an experience, and its concept, is dependent on the concept, 
pre-supposition or privileging of presence; that is )according to Derrida) the very 
definition of “experience” – that which comes to us, or has done, or will come, as 
something present to us in a definite, present, moment in time 
•  thus, we are caught in a logical circle.  How should we “escape”?  According to the 
explicit words of Heidegger, there remain one or two legitimate ploys in the 
circumstance: 
o  at the outset of Being and Time, the task of interrogating Being is deemed to be 
the primary characteristic of that being which we, the inquirers, are ourselves – 
namely, Dasein.  “Thus, to work out the question of Being, we must make an 
entity – the inquirer – transparent in its being.”  There appears to be “manifest 
circularity” in this exercise,  a logical aporia: but, for Heidegger, that aporia is 
cancelled out by an appeal away from formal questions of logic towards the 
“factical” (faktisch) situation of Dasein always already having a pre-supposition 
about Being (however unthematised) at its disposal. 
o  in respect of the hermeneutic circle of interpretation described in section 32 of 
Being and Time, the circular fore-structure of understanding is not vicious in 
operation, nor is it to be seen as an imperfection; rather, it is “the most 
primordial kind of knowing”, and our task is to ensure a correct way of entry 
into the circle of interpretation 
•  however, for Derrida’s Heidegger, the answer to the above–stated logical aporia 
(namely, that to question presence we must return to primordial experiences; but 
“experience” can only be thought and only occur on the basis of presence itself) lies 
neither in the “facticity” of Dasein’s Being; nor is it a question of how we enter into 
this particular circle (whether or not we might think of it as an hermeneutical one).  
What Derrida says that Heidegger is doing in this long note to Being and Time – 
even if Heidegger is not saying himself that he is doing it – is to show us that we 
cannot actually think in any other way than on the basis of presence.  In other 
words, in the very activity of our having run through this “logical aporia”, we have 
done something; something has occurred; an event has happened.  Assuming we 
were reading (that is, allowing the text to have an effect), we have acted something 
out, something with the formal structure of a circle; and this acting out has shown 
us, not another way of thinking, but rather has demonstrated to us, in an 
experience, that we cannot think experience in any other way than on the basis of 
presence.  We have thus experienced the “impossibility of the otherwise”, as 
Derrida puts it.  And experiencing this impossibility is not nothing, it is not trivial. 
 
There is produced, in the thought of the impossibility of the otherwise, in this 
not otherwise, a certain difference, a certain trembling, a certain decentring that 
is not the position of an other centre (p38) 
 
This “other passageway” is hidden in the text of Being and Time, or in the note to it , because 
Heidegger tends to avoid its explicit statement.   Rather, Derrida’s argument goes, we are 
carried through this passageway by the experience of reading the text itself.  It presents us with 
an impossibility, or we experience that impossibility, and this performance is not nothing; it has 
an effect. 
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What this means is that Heidegger’s explicit task of the Destruktion of metaphysics remains, in 
a way, too  explicit.  In its appeal to primordiality, primordial experience, primordial “sources” 
(as he has it elsewhere), which will – he claims – free us from the tradition, it gets caught up in 
the metaphysical language it claims to attempt to overcome.  As Derrida has it in Ends of Man 
(also in Margins), there are two types of strategic bet that can be placed, two wagers that can 
be made, two positings that we can give ourselves in respect of a questioning of philosophy, 
metaphysics, onto-theology.  You can: 
 
a)  attempt an exit or a deconstruction of metaphysics without changing terrain 
b)  change terrain, in discontinuous fashion; announce the revolution in thought and 
move onto a different location 
 
If Derrida states that Heidegger’s wager is usually, “mainly”, for the former option of working 
within the terrain, then he acknowledges immediately the paradox of the latter apparently more 
risky strategy, namely that even on the simple level of language one will straight-away collapse 
back into the terrain one was hoping to leave, since the “practice of language reinstates the 
new terrain on the oldest ground”, inevitably. 
 
But none-the-less, Derrida’s point remains, that Heidegger’s wager tends to be for the former, 
for the existing terrain of metaphysics.  Hence, despite the former’s respecting of the hidden 
passageway in Heidegger, he goes on in Ousia and Gramme to take to pieces the central task of 
Being and Time – namely the search for the meaning  of Being.  And this on a number of fronts: 
 
•  in note 11, Derrida questions Heidegger’s notion of the “fallen temporality” of 
Dasein; is not this distinction between “proper” and “improper”, between 
“authentic” and “inauthentic” and between the originary and the nonoriginary itself a 
“tributary” of the vulgar concept of time? 
•  in discussing time, does Heidegger not repeat Zeno’s aporia without dealing with it, 
ie without, in Derrida’s terms, deconstructing it? 
•  does Bataille not “give us to think” that it is not only time, commonly understood, 
which is vulgar?  “Meaning” itself is also marked by vulgarity.  Meaning is always 
thought on the basis of presence, and this is true even for an investigation of the 
“meaning of Being”; how can it then hope to escape the metaphysics it wishes to 
shake or Destrukt? 
 
We are wavering back and forth here, with Derrida, as to the status of Destruktion.  It is 
possible to believe that in Ousia and Gramme it remains undecided? If that essay is carrying out 
a deconstruction, then whether or not this operates according to the logic of a Heideggerian 
Destruktion seems to be decided first one way and then the other.  But what interests Derrida, 
and what interests deconstruction, is the fact of this movement.  This movement is explicated 
first with an example (that of time, and its relationship to the linear inscription in space – the 
gramme - in Aristotle’s Physics) and then as structural law. 
 
Briefly, the argument runs: 
•  after an intricate discussion of the question of the “at the same time” (hama) and 
the numbered number of time in the Physics, Derrida states that the “graphic linear 
representation of time is simultaneously required and excluded by Aristotle”.  It is 
excluded by virtue of the fact the Aristotle rejects the idea that the “now” is to time 
what a “point” is to a line.  Trying to use a “multiplicity of immobilities”, such as 
points, to create a series, “does not give time”, according to Aristotle 
•  however, the gramme, the linear inscription, is not rejected by Aristotle as such 
according to Derrida – it is rejected merely in its representation as a series of points.  
And yet a point, says Aristotle, in distinction to the line, is never present and takes 
its existence only from a line. 
•  thus, we can distinguish between time and a line thought of as a series of now-
points; but this means to think of time on the basis of a completed line, one fully 
present (rather than made up of a series of points) 
•  thus, as critique of the thinking of time on the basis of presence, on the basis of the 
point-like nature of the “now”, ends up doing the opposite of what it thought it 
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would do; namely it at once empties out the presence of the “now” and posits the 
line, the gramme, as present as soon as this is used to explicate the nature of time.  
Thus Aristotle, and with him the whole of metaphysics, comes back to: 
 
“Time is that which is thought on the basis of Being as presence, and if something is to 
be thought beyond the determination of Being as presence, it cannot…still… be called 
time” 
Thus: 
  “to criticise the manipulation of any one of these concepts [time, ousia, parousia, 
gramme] from within the system always amounts to going round in circles; to 
reconstituting, according to another configuration, the same system” 
 
The formal law is the law of the circle – it is, Derrida claims, an a priori law which states that 
every text of metaphysics carried within itself both  the metaphysical concepts and the means 
to criticise them; eg both the vulgar concept of time and the means to criticise it.  This “must 
be thought of as a formal rule for anyone wishing to read the texts of the history of 
metaphysics”. 
 
Derrida concludes Ousia and Gramme with three suggestions: 
1)  that there is no “vulgar concept of time”, simply because metaphysics, as the 
structure within which both “concept” and “time” take their position, cannot be 
gotten around: there can be no other concept of time 
2)  that in asking this question, we are remaining within Heidegger’s thought, since 
then question of “primordial temporality” interrupts Being and Time, it does not 
close it.   Derrida has it that even if Heidegger does not question the “efficacy of the 
“destruction”” achieved by the analytic of Dasein, he had, with the suspension of 
Being and Time, to “go at it otherwise” 
3)  finally, that if there is something to be thought beyond presence, then this cannot 
be thought of as simply absence, ie on the basis of presence.  It would be beyond 
the dyad absence/presence, and is thought of here as a trace which is nether 
perceptible nor imperceptible within the text; rather, it is erased in the text, this 
erasure thought actively, so that “the trace is produced as its own erasure”. 
 
Thus, the ontological difference between Being and beings, as forgotten in the text of 
metaphysics, “(is)(itself) trace”, since difference is not absence and not presence.  And, at the 
same time, this erasure of difference and the trace has occurred “in the metaphysical text”, 
which means that presence is not what “a trace refers back to”, but rather the opposite: 
presence is “the trace of the trace”, even thought there is no “trace itself”, no proper trace, 
according to a formal law which relates somehow to the experience of the impossible in circular 
fashion: when that which is not present (the trace) is itself traced, then the effect is presence. 
 
In other words, and to return briefly to the essay Ends of Man (Margins page 134), what is at 
issue here is a reduction of meaning towards structure and system.  Meaning, presence, is to be 
decided on the basis of a formal structure which itself has no meaning; that is, on the formal la 
of the trace of the trace, of difference/differance. 
 
Whatever we and Derrida can say of Heidegger’s Destruktion, it is the explicit acknowledgment 
of this formal structure, this a priori law, which distinguishes Derrida’s deconstruction.  Derrida 
argues for a kind of performative effectiveness of Heidegger’s text: the performative of the 
experience of the impossibility of a thinking otherwise: the performative of the termination of 
the project of Being and Time and its opening towards what Derrida calls “other horizons”.  But 
deconstruction has to be acknowledged as that thought which recognises something unspoken 
within the destruktion back to primordial experiences and which comprises a formal law 
associated with or implicit in these performatives. 
 
And because the notion of this law has a movement to it which is en abym (“the trace of the 
trace”) this enables deconstruction, in the end, to avoid in particular the movement which 
Derrida makes note of at several points in Ousia and Gramme, namely the movement of falling, 
the reference to the “fallen temporality” of Dasein, and the structure associated with the 
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opposition of “proper” to “improper”, “authentic” to “inauthentic” and so forth.  This avoidance 
is the avoidance of what Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche had already called - in Nietzsche 
and Philosophy – nihilism.  That is, that nihilism which consists in giving the finite world the 
character of the fallen, of valuing it essentially below some prior or superior state.  This 
avoidance – so far as I know entirely consistent in Derrida’s work – is what enables him to 
invoke legitimately at the end of Ends of Man the Nietzschian laugh, the dance, the affirmative 
“yes, yes”, 
 
That is why, to pick up very briefly on a later paper of Derrida’s, it is possible for him for claim 
that deconstruction is justice (hence that justice, unlike the law which has to have a clear 
delimitation of proper/improper, cannot be deconstructed); and the reason why, to the 
postscript of that piece, he can conclude that in his consideration of justice 
 
  it is the thought of the difference between… [Heideggerian Destruktion]… on the one 
hand and a deconstructive affirmation on the other that has guided… this reading 
 
 
[Ends] 
 